The article starts with a brief survey of Unprovability Theory as of autumn 2006. Then, as an illustration of the subject's model-theoretic methods, we re-prove exact versions of unprovability results for the Paris-Harrington Principle and the KanamoriMcAloon Principle using indiscernibles. In addition, we obtain a short accessible proof of unprovability of the Paris-Harrington Principle. The proof employs old ideas but uses only one colouring and directly extracts the set of indiscernibles from its homogeneous set. We also present modified, abridged statements whose unprovability proofs are especially simple. These proofs were tailored for teaching purposes.
The intended audience of this paper consists of logicians, logic-aware mathematicians and thinkers of other backgrounds who are interested in unprovable mathematical statements. The paper starts with a brief survey, listing many important achievements and directions of the subject. Most of the results speak for themselves and we omit a discussion of how they are interrelated as well as the story of the subject's big questions, goals, exciting conjectures and dreams which is presumed to be partly known to the readers. The survey is biased towards the Paris-Harrington Principle and its exact versions (understanding this topic is an excellent first step for anyone who decides to study unprovability). In the second part of the paper the reader will find full and very accessible unprovability proofs developed for teaching purposes: the optimal unprovability proof of the Paris-Harrington Principle, two abridged statements whose unprovability proofs are simplest possible and, finally, a model-theoretic proof of some threshold results (exact unprovability results).
Brief survey
Peano Arithmetic Peano Arithmetic (PA) is a first-order theory in the language of arithmetic L = {+, ×, < , 0, 1} that consists of the following axioms: associativity and commutativity of + and ×, their neutral elements are 0 and 1 respectively, distributivity, discrete linear order axioms for < (total order, there is a first element 0, no last element, every element has an immediate successor, every nonzero element has an immediate predecessor), 1 is the successor of 0, x < y → x + z < y + z and the induction scheme: for every L-formula ϕ(x, y), we have an axiom ∀y[ ϕ(0, y) ∧ ∀x(ϕ(x, y) → ϕ(x + 1, y)) → ∀xϕ(x, y) ]. In this article we shall deal only with Peano Arithmetic and some of its subsystems but for further study of the subject, beyond this article, the readers will eventually need to explore the whole story surrounding the notions of logical strength and consistency strength of theories and understand the picture of the scale of consistency strength. Although not required to understand the current article, a list of theories that are important in the subject (stretching all way from I∆ 0 and I∆ 0 (exp) to the strongest extensions of ZFC) can be found on pages 39-40 in [37] .
All concrete mathematics of the past can be conducted in Peano Arithmetic It is common to identify theorems of PA with 'finite mathematics', that is the world of mathematical theorems that can be formulated in L and whose proof does not require the use of any notion of 'infinite set' in an essential way. Theorems of finite mathematics include the table of derivatives, the table of integrals of elementary functions, for every arithmetically definable complex function f , "if f is analytic on C and bounded then f is a constant", "in R 24 , there is a way to place 196560 non-overlapping unit spheres that touch the unit sphere", "the sum p, p + 2 both prime 1 p converges", etc. (It is an exercise to check that all these statements can be formulated in the language L and their usual proofs can be conducted in Peano Arithmetic.) We give these examples in order to illustrate the extent of what is meant by 'finite mathematics' and show that in this understanding, 'finite mathematics' embraces not only finite combinatorial manipulations but all imaginable mathematics whose objects can be somehow finitely approximated or finitely encoded, including everyday 'continuous' mathematics and many branches of mathematics that seem to use notions beyond that of a natural number but will usually have a way to avoid it by approximations and coding. [71] ). In a model M IΣ 1 , an initial segment I is called semi-regular if for every a ∈ I and every function f : [0, a] → M (i.e., an M -coded set of pairs), the image of f is bounded in I. Every semi-regular initial segment satisfies IΣ 1 . An initial segment I is called strong if for every M -coded partition P : [I] 3 → 2, there is an M -coded I-unbounded P -homogeneous subset. Every strong initial segment is a model of PA. Other important classes of initial segments (closed under certain externally-described combinatorial operations) include regular (satisfies BΣ 2 ), n-extendible (corresponds to IΣ n+1 ) and n-Ramsey (corresponds to IΣ n+1 ) initial segments. Now, if a Σ 1 -definable in IΣ 1 Skolem function Y (x, y) is such that for all a < b in M , Y (a, b) > N if and only if there is a strong initial segment between a and b then the statement "for all a and c, there is b > a such that Y (a, b) > c" is unprovable in Peano Arithmetic. The function Y (x, y) is called an indicator for strong initial segments because it indicates whether the set [a, b] is large enough to accommodate a strong initial segment. (Similarly for all other kinds of initial segments above.) All early Ramsey-style independence results can be described in this setting. In case of the Paris-Harrington Principle, the function Y (x, y) = the maximal c such that for every colouring P : [x, y] c → c, there is a homogeneous subset H of size 2c such that |H| > min H is an indicator for strong initial segments.
Many early indicator proofs were conducted in terms of a game between two players where Player I tries to ensure that the final initial segment between a and b is, say, strong, and Player II tries to prevent it. The game of finite (nonstandard) length is determined, so it turns out that if a set is large enough then Player I has a winning strategy, otherwise Player II has a winning strategy. Original sources are [52] and [71] . For another example connecting games and independence results, see the general idea and the Peano Arithmetic section in a recent article by P. Pudlák [74] . There is much more left to say about games and independence results, e.g., about unprovability of existence of a winning strategy in certain games.
Indicator theory ideas are also useful in the model-theoretic approach to Reverse Mathematics, in the spirit of the model-theoretic proof by J. Paris and L. Kirby in [52] that RT 3 2 (the infinite Ramsey Theorem for triples and two colours) implies all of PA, thus providing an alternative to the recursion-theoretic approach to these matters. Modern-day examples of such model-theoretic proofs in the style of indicator theory can be found in the articles [14] and [15] by the author and A. Weiermann.
PH is an arithmetical version of large cardinals The historical prototypes of the Paris-Harrigton Principle and the earlier PA-unprovable statements of [70] are large cardinal axioms. In the case of arithmetic, closedness properties postulated by large cardinal axioms correspond to closedness properties of initial segments of models of arithmetic under the (external) combinatorial properties described above: semi-regularity, regularity, strength, extendibility and Ramseyness. This analogy eventually led to the Paris-Harrington principle and was important in the early days of the subject but was later abandoned and almost forgotten. It may be very fruitful to have a fresh look at this analogy, especially having in mind the modern advances in the study of large cardinals. J. Ketonen's manuscripts [49] , [51] provide an alternative way to view such analogy, using ordinals, a theme that is closely connected with the fundamental Ketonen-Solovay article [50] .
Fragments of Peano Arithmetic
If we restrict the induction scheme to Σ n -formulas, that is, arithmetical formulas of the form ∃x 1 ∀x 2 ∃x 3 . . . ϕ(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n , y), where ϕ is preceded by no more than n quantifiers and itself contains no unbounded quantifiers, then the theory obtained is denoted by IΣ n ("induction for Σ n -formulas"). Clearly, for every n, IΣ n ⊆ IΣ n+1 and PA = ∞ n=1 IΣ n . Also, it is known that for every n, IΣ n = IΣ n+1 since IΣ n+1 proves Con(IΣ n ).
A useful alternative axiomatisation of IΣ n uses an instance of the least-number principle ∀y[ ∃xϕ(x, y) → ∃z(ϕ(z, y) ∧ ∀w < z¬ϕ(w, y)] for every Σ n -formula ϕ(x, y).
It is widely believed that all L-theorems of existing mathematics (apart from logicians' discoveries we are talking about in this article) can be proved not only in PA but even in IΣ 2 . It would be surprising if someone managed to find an existing theorem in mathematics that can be formulated in L but does not have a proof formalisable in IΣ 2 .
For every k ∈ N, the statement PH (k+1) defined as "for all n and c, there exists N such that for every colouring f of (k + 1)-subsets of {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} into c colours, there is an f -homogeneous H ⊂ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} of size at least n such that |H| > min H" is IΣ k -unprovable [71] and is equivalent to KM (k+1) (the Kanamori-McAloon Principle for (k + 1)-subsets) and to RFN Σ1 (IΣ k ), the 1-consistency of
(It says "for all Σ 1 -statements ϕ, if IΣ k proves ϕ then ϕ holds". In order to write it as a formula, it is necessary to use the satisfaction predicate for Σ 1 -formulas. Unprovability of RFN Σ1 (IΣ k ) in IΣ k easily follows from Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem: put ϕ to be ∃x x = x to observe that RFN Σ1 (IΣ k ) implies Con IΣ k .) A good exposition of 1-consistency and reflection principles is in the old Smorynski's paper [85] , a good exposition of the satisfaction predicate is in Kaye's textbook [48] .
Threshold results for PH and KM Let log (n) (x) = log 2 (log 2 . . . log 2 n times (x)) and the tower-function 2 n (x) be defined as 2 0 (x) = x,
. Also, define log * (m) as the minimal n such that 2 n (2) ≥ m. The Ramsey number R(k, c, m) is defined as the minimal number such that for any colouring of k-subsets of {0, 1, 2, . . . , R(k, c, m) − 1} in c colours, there is a monochromatic subset of size m. For any set X, we write [X] n for the set of its n-subsets. The set of all n-subsets of {a, a + 1, . . . , b} will be denoted by [a, b] n , without any confusion. As usual, a natural number N is identified with the set of its predecessors {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}.
For every function F (x), define PH (k)
F as the statement "for all n and c there exists N such that for every f : [N ] k → c, there is a homogeneous H ⊆ N of size at least n and such that F (min H) < |H|". We say that f is F -regressive if for all
F as the statement "for all n there exists N such that for every F -regressive f defined on [N ] k , there is a min-homogeneous subset of N of size at least n". Also, define PH F as ∀k PH
F . It is easy to see that for every strictly increasing F , PH F implies PH and KM F implies KM thus making these statements PA-unprovable. A. Weiermann [89] proved that for every n, PH log (n) is PA-unprovable but PH log * is PA-provable. In the case of fixed dimension, the story is more complex. The following interesting result was first proved by Gyesik Lee [59] for all n = k − 1 and later completed by L. Carlucci, G. Lee and A. Weiermann [22] 
Similar theorems hold for the family PH (k) log (n) :
log (n) (G.Lee [59] ).
There are even slightly sharper threshold results for this case in [22] . Here is the picture in the case k = 1 (see [56] ): if A −1 is the inverse of the Ackermann function and {F m } m∈ω is the Grzegorczyk hierarchy of primitive recursive functions then:
In particular, KM (2) log is provable but PH (2) log is unprovable. The reason for IΣ 1 -provability of PH (k+1) log (n) and KM (k+1) log (n) for large n comes from the Erdös-Rado theorem [28] , which implies that an upper bound for the Ramsey number R(m, k + 1, m) is 2 n (m) for some large enough n depending only on k. Given m and c, let = max{m, c}. Consider any colouring f : [0, 2 n ( )] k+1 → c. By the Ramsey Theorem, there is H ⊂ [0, 2 n ( )] of size at least which is f -homogeneous. Also, log Kruskal's Theorem and well-quasi-orders Very often an unprovable statement can be viewed as a 'miniaturisation' of an infinitary theorem. A spectacular example of miniaturisation is H. Friedman's Theorem [79] on unprovability of a finite version of Kruskal's Theorem. Define a (nonplane, rooted) tree as a partially ordered set with the least element and such that the set of all predecessors of every point is linearly ordered. Infinite Kruskal's Theorem says: if T 1 , T 2 , . . . is an infinite sequence of finite trees then there are i < j such that T i T j , i.e., there is an inf-preserving embedding from T i into T j (that is, trees are well-quasi-ordered by ). Friedman's Theorem says that neither the Infinite Kruskal Theorem nor its finite version ('miniaturisation') "for all k there is N such that whenever T i N i=1 is a sequence of finite trees such that for all i ≤ N we have |T i | ≤ k + i then there are i < j ≤ N such that T i T j " is provable in ATR 0 , a theory stronger than Peano Arithmetic. Here, |T | is the number of vertices in T . Also, Kruskal's theorem restricted to binary trees is unprovable in ACA 0 (and its finite version unprovable in PA) and Kruskal's theorem for binary trees and two labels unprovable in ATR 0 . (There are also important results by L. Gordeev about the strength of Kruskal's theorem with gap-condition and other unprovability results in [39, 40, 41] .) It was later shown by M. Loebl and J. Matoušek [60] that if the condition
2 log 2 i then the statement becomes IΣ 1 -provable but for the condition |T i | ≤ k + 4 log 2 i, the statement is PA-unprovable. What happens between 1 2 and 4 was recently resolved by A. Weiermann [88] . Let α be Otter's constant (α = Similar results have been proved by A. Weiermann for plane trees, binary plane trees, Higman's lemma [92] , ordinal notations [90] , [88] . Several general theorems have recently been proved by the author [12] , giving an answer to the following question: if X is a well-quasi-ordered combinatorial class (i.e., there is a fixed notion of size of objects and for every n there are finitely-many objects of size n) such that for some function f , the statement "for all K there is N such that whenever X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X N are in X and for all i ≤ N , |X i | < K + f (i) then for some i < j ≤ N , X i X j " is unprovable in some theory T , what is the exact threshold function that separates provable and T -unprovable instances of the corresponding well-quasi-orderedness statements for Seq(X) (the set of all finite sequences of elements of X), Cyc(X) (finite cycles of elements of X), Mult(X) (finite multisets of X), Trees(X) (plane rooted trees labeled by X) and some other compound combinatorial classes that inherit well-quasi-orderedness from X by a usual minimal bad sequence argument? The proofs use Weiermann-style compression techniques and ideas from analytic combinatorics. There should be ordinal-theoretic results closely connected to these theorems (roughly: how the multiset-, sequence-, cycle-, tree-and other constructions transform the maximal order-types of well-ordered linearisations of original well-quasiorders) but these results, to the author's knowledge, haven't yet been written down by anyone.
Another important example is a theorem by H. Friedman, N. Robertson and P. Seymour on unprovability of the Graph Minor Theorem [32] . For multigraphs G and H, we say that H is a minor of G if H can be obtained from G by a succession of three elementary operations: edge removal, edge contraction and removal of an isolated vertex. The firstorder version of their theorem states that the statement "for all k there is N such that whenever G 1 , . . . , G N is a sequence of finite multigraphs such that for all i ≤ N we have
a very strong subsystem of second-order arithmetic. Multigraphs can well be replaced by simple graphs in this formulation.
For a function f , let the statement GM f be "for all K there is N such that for any sequence of simple graphs G 1 , G 2 , . . . , G N such that |G i | < K + f (i), there are i < j such that G i is a minor of G j ". It is now easy to conjecture that for every primitive recursive real number a, if a ≤ √ 2 then GM a·
log is unprovable. So far it has been proved by the author in [12] 
is IΣ 1 -provable and GM 7 log is PA-unprovable. A certain lemma on graph enumeration is currently missing for the proof of the full conjecture to go through. There are similar conjectures about unprovability thresholds for Kruskal's theorem with gap condition and for graph minor theorem for subcubic graphs and for classes of graphs omitting certain minors. This enterprise has to use analytic combinatorics, graph minor theory and Pólya theory.
Well-quasi-order theory has been extensively studied in the framework of Reverse Mathematics ( [83] ), the study of logical strength and consistency strength of second-order arithmetical assertions. Reverse Mathematics is the closest relative of first-order unprovability theory and there is exchange of ideas flowing both ways. There are many results, methods and ideas in Reverse Mathematics that are very relevant to the subject but we omit them in this brief survey. It is difficult to draw a strict line between the two subjects and any future exposition of first-order unprovability may have to incorporate some discussion of relevant parts of Reverse Mathematics.
Single tree, single sequence and boolean relation theory Here is a new way to obtain unprovable statements from existing statements that talk about long sequences of objects by assembling elements of sequences of objects into one single object to talk about, with order (or embeddability) relation between objects in the sequence becoming order (or embeddability) relation between chunks of this single object. For a tree T , let T [i] be the tree of nodes of T of height ≤ i. It has been proved by H. Friedman in [35] that the statement "for all n and k there is K such that whenever T is a rooted nonplane tree labeled by {1, 2, . . . , n} and every non-leaf has degree k then there are i < j ≤ K such that T [i] is inf-preserving, label-preserving and leaf-preserving embeddable into T [j]" is equivalent to 1-consistency of Π 1 2 -TI 0 , a system much stronger than Peano Arithmetic, and even the statement with k = 2 already implies 1-consistency of ATR 0 . There are also versions that involve a gap-condition. Another application of similar ideas deals with Higman's lemma. The statement "for all m there is K such that for every K-sequence x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x K of elements of {1, 2, . . . , m}, there are i < j < K 2 such that x i , x i+1 , . . . , x 2i is a subsequence of x j , x j+1 , . . . , x 2j " is unprovable in IΣ 2 (see [36] ).
Another series of H. Friedman's results under the general name of "boolean relation theory" can be found in [38] : if we list all (second-order) statements of a certain simple shape (all of them a priori equally simple and natural) and try to classify them according to their truth, some of them turn out to be unprovable in some theories stronger than ZF, e.g. the following statement from [38] is provably in ACA equivalent to 1-consistency of the theory ZFC + {there is an n-Mahlo cardinal} n∈ω : "for any two functions f , g : Sine, zeta-function, diophantine approximation and universality The results in this section spring from H. Friedman's sine-principle [11] . For every n ≥ 1 and every function F of one argument, let us introduce the statement SP n F : "for all m, there is N such that for any sequence a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a N of rational numbers, there is H ⊆ A of size m such that for any two n-element subsets a i1 < a i2 < · · · < a in and a i1 < a k2
For n ≥ 2 and any function F (x) eventually dominated by ( is not provable in IΣ n . The proof in [11] uses the Rhin-Viola theorem on irrationality measure of π.
The sine-principle led to a series of exciting developments. What other functions can be taken instead of sine so that the statement would still be unprovable? The following theorem by the author and A. Weiermann [16] describes a large class of such functions. Let f , g and h be three functions such that for any N ∈ N and any small ε > 0, 1. h is a periodic function with period a, continuous on its period; 2. f is such that for any b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b N , linearly independent over aQ and any
3. g is any continuous function on a subset of R whose image contains [d, +∞) for some d ∈ R.
Then the statement "for all m and n, there is N such that for any sequence a i N i=1 of rational numbers, there is H ⊆ N of size m such that for any two n-sequences i 1 < i 2 < . . . < i n and i 1 < k 2 < . . . < k n of natural numbers smaller than N ,
is unprovable in Peano Arithmetic and the versions for fixed n are unprovable in IΣ n−1 . This class of functions includes sin(p(
for any non-constant polynomial p (using H. Weyl's theorem on simultaneous diophantine approximation). In particular, the proof of this general theorem shows that unprovability of the sine-principle can now be demonstrated using simultaneous diophantine approximation instead of an argument involving irrationality measure of π. We have several conjectures that suggest versions of these results in p-adic setting.
Another interesting example deals with the Riemann zeta-function [16] : for any σ ∈ R, consider the statement "for all m and n, there is N such that for any sequence a i N i=1 of rational numbers, there is H ⊆ N of size m such that for any two n-sequences i 1 < i 2 < . . . < i n and i 1 < k 2 < . . . < k n of natural numbers smaller than N ,
". For σ > 1, the unprovability proof is similar to that for sin(x), using almost periodicity. For σ ∈ ( 1 2 , 1], the unprovability proof uses a probabilistic argument.
The reason behind unprovability of these statements is that Ramsey-style assertions (in this case the Kanamori-McAloon Principle) can be concealed in this setting by replacing quantification over all possible colourings by the quantifier over all possible sequences of rational numbers. E.g. in the case of the sine-function, what we need is that every function is approximated by sine on some subset: for any ε > 0, K, n and any function g : [K] n → [−1, 1], there is a sequence of rational numbers a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a K such that for
This situation where all possible patterns (e.g. functions, colourings, etc) are already present in one complex object is called universality and there is more to say about using universal objects to reformulate Ramsey-style statements.
The following unprovability results have been proved in [16] , using discrete analogues of S. Voronin's universality theorem about the Riemann zeta-function. The statement "for all n there is N such that whenever a i N i=1 are natural numbers, there is a subset H ⊂ N of size n such that for all k < l < m in H,
The statement "for all n there is N such that whenever a i N i=1 are natural numbers, there is a subset H ⊂ N of size n such that for all k < l < m in H,
. Similar results will hold for a wide range of zeta-and L-functions.
Universality, in the broad understanding of the word, will be a rich source of unprovable statements in the future. We want to encode and treat a random colouring of n-tuples, so assertions that involve all possible patterns (or some 'random' patterns) of finite configurations should attract our attention. Nowadays, it should be possible to show unprovability of some (versions of) already existing strong conjectures in, say, number theory. A promising example that begs for an independence proof is Schinzel's hypothesis H (that is rooted in the work of 19th century mathematicians, e.g. Bunyakovskiy): "for any finite collection of irreducible polynomials P 1 (x), P 2 (x), . . . , P n (x) with integer coefficients and such that i≤n P i has no fixed prime divisor, there exist infinitely-many integers m such that for all i ≤ n, P i (m) are prime". This conjecture is extremely strong (implying the twin-prime conjecture and infinity of the set of primes of the form n 2 + 1) and its formulation already provides some necessary ingredients for the unprovability proof. (IΣ 1 -unprovability of hypothesis H was already conjectured in the PhD thesis of A. Woods [93] ).
Braids
Braids are very popular and interesting objects in today's mainstream mathematics. The n-strand braid group B n is a group with the following presentation: At the dawn of modern logic, early logicians, most notably K. Gödel, wrote about ordinal descent through ω ω ω with justification why this is an acceptable mathematical principle. This ordinal was perceived by some people at that time as the biggest ordinal that allows for a convincing verbal "justification" of why the corresponding ordinal descent principle is true. This ordinal nowadays turns up in various natural mathematical contexts, see for example Higman's lemma and S. Simpson's article [82] on the Robson Basis Theorem.
One more family of independence results comes from braid-theoretic analogues of the hydra battle. Termination of the following game on positive braids is unprovable in IΣ 2 .
(These results have been proved jointly by Lorenzo Carlucci and the author in [13] .) In the rest of this section, we write i instead of σ i . For numbers a, b, define a wave between a and b as the braid word w a,b = a(a + 1) 
[k] consists of positive even braid words and decreases with respect to the braid ordering ≺. Eventually it terminates but its termination is unprovable in IΣ 2 . There are versions of this sequence for 3-strand braids [13] : a simple version, whose termination time is Ackermannian and another one, formulated as a game, whose termination is unprovable in IΣ 2 .
There is some hope to translate statements about braids into geometrical, topological statements with some amount of 'physical' meaning, e.g. using the fact that braid groups are fundamental groups of certain configuration spaces. This is a very rich topic with many new results (all so far based on left-orderability of certain groups) being obtained these days by P. Dehornoy, A. Weiermann, L. Carlucci and the author (for a survey, see [17] ).
Long term rewriting
Another interesting twist in the story is the rewrite systems whose termination is PAunprovable. Good references are short articles by L. Beklemishev [6] and W. Buchholz [20] . An early rewrite system that imitated the hydra was proposed by Dershowitz. Recently, G. Moser [67] provided a full analysis of this system and related systems. Alternative systems have been formulated by W. Buchholz and by H. Touzet [87] . There are also rel-evant results by I. Lepper. Here is an example by L. Beklemishev [5] presented as a battle between a gardener and a worm. (It is not exactly a rewrite system but there are versions of it formulated as a rewrite system in [6] .) A worm is a finite sequence of natural numbers f : {0, 1, . . . , m} → N. For every worm w = f (0), f (1), . . . , f (m), define w[n] as follows. If f (m) = 0 then chop it off, i.e., put w[n] = f (0), f (1), . . . , f (m − 1). Otherwise find the maximal place k < m such that f (k) < f (n), define two words r = f (0), . . . , f (k) and s = f (k + 1), . . . , f (m − 1), f (m) − 1 and set w[n] to be r followed by (n + 1) copies of s. The statement ∀w∃n w[1] [2] . . . [n] = ∅ ("every worm dies") is unprovable in Peano Arithmetic.
Other examples
Many other examples of unprovable statements and a discussion of the subject in its late 1970s -early 1980s state can be found in the four volumes [80] , [81] , [68] and [7] , devoted entirely or partially to arithmetical unprovability results. In addition, I would like to mention unprovable statements obtained by translating consistency statements for various theories into non-solvability assertions about corresponding Diophantine equations (see [63] ), unprovable statements about Diophantine games [63] , the Schütte-Simpson treatment of finite sequences of natural numbers with gap-condition [78] , K. McAloon's [64] , [65] and Z. Ratajczyk's [75] , [76] theories of iterations of the Paris-Harrington Principle and R. Sommer's related result on transfinite induction [86] , independence results on pointwise induction by T. Arai [1] , J. Avigad's statement with update procedures [4] , P. Clote's PhD thesis and his anti-basis approach to independence results [25] , Cichon's treatment of Goodstein sequences [24] , Bigorajska-Kotlarski series of results on partitioning α-large sets (see e.g. [8] , [9] ), the Friedman-McAloon-Simpson early fundamental article [30] and the subsequent paper by S. Shelah [84] , J.-P. Ressayre's statements unprovable in IΣ 1 , PA and ZF that state existence of finite approximations of models of these theories [77] , the treatment of infinitary strong statements by means of J. Paris-style density assertions in [14] and [15] by the author and A. Weiermann, the Kochen-Kripke proof with ultrapowers [57] , the Buchholz Hydra [19] , L. Carlucci's recent uniform treatment of hydras, worms and sequences with gap condition [23] and H. Friedman's many results on combinatorial statements unprovable in ZFC+ large cardinals [31] , [34] . (Many new unprovable statements are announced regularly on H. Friedman's webpage, so we shall not even attempt to give an up-to-date account of these rapid developments here.)
The subject of first-order arithmetical unprovability has a big number of results, some of them masterpieces, produced by different authors, and is rapidly developing these days. Although it is one of the most central subjects in logic and is already seriously connected with many mathematical disciplines, there are currently no comprehensive monographs, no textbooks, not even surveys. This current sketchy and incomplete introduction is a mere glimpse at the subject and is intended to be a modest patch in this state of affairs, without any serious discussion of the subject's goals, its big fundamental questions, its history, its implications for philosophy of mathematics or its visions of the future and without any attempt to analyse and systematise its methods and ideas.
Methods of proving unprovability
Unprovability proofs so far usually fall into one of two broad categories. The first category consists of model-theoretic constructions that demonstrate how, assuming a statement, a model of our strong theory can be built directly, 'by hands'. Proofs of the first category work very well for Ramsey-style statements and for strong theories. The second category consists of combinatorial proofs springing from proof theory and the Ketonen-Solovay article [50] (which shows combinatorially that the function arising from PH eventually dominates every function of the Grzegorczyk-Schwichtenberg-Wainer hierarchy (since all PA-provably recursive functions occur in this hierarchy, the result follows)) or from the study of well-quasi-ordered sets [79] . Most of the proofs in the volume [80] are of this category, as well as the articles [61] and [62] by M. Loebl and J. Nešetřil. Proofs in this category work very well (often better than model-theoretic proofs) at the lower end of consistency strength and for well-quasi-orders, like trees, whose ordinal treatment is well-developed but the model-theoretic treatment is currently absent.
Apart from the original articles we mentioned above, other good sources reporting on proofs of the first category would be the book [43] by P. Hájek and P. Pudlák and the papers [2] , [3] by J. Avigad and R. Sommer (proof-theoretic aspects). A recent book manuscript [58] by H. Kotlarski is an exposition of both approaches as well as of many different proofs of Gödel's Theorem. The second category is well explained in an early article by W. Buchholz and S. Wainer [18] , in the Friedman-Sheard article [33] , in the Fairtlough-Wainer paper [29] and in the recent article by A. Weiermann [91] .
Apparently, there is also a third category of unprovability proofs, proofs that interpret directly independent statements as reduction strategies for proof systems. We have little to say about it and refer the reader to a recent article by L. Carlucci [21] , an old paper by H. Jervell [46] and the articles [44] and [45] by M. Hamano and M. Okada.
Once we have one unprovable statement, it is usually possible to find a series of mathematical statements in very different contexts that imply our statement, sometimes in a very non-trivial way. It often happens that non-logical mathematical obstacles in proving such implications are difficult and deep. In this way, the original Ramsey-theoretic and well-quasi-order-theoretic reasons for unprovability may end up very well hidden, and new mathematical statements appear natural and still carry a big amount of unprovability and logical strength.
Some people somehow view research in unprovability in terms of big numbers and fast-growing functions. Indeed, big numbers and fast-growing functions often occur in our discourse. (For example, the Paris-Harrington Principle implies every Π 2 theorem of Peano Arithmetic, including totality of every PA-provably recursive function.) However, this simple perception of the subject eventually misleads when one reaches the higher strata of consistency strength where the philosophical status of unprovable statements is very different. It is better, at least in the context of this article (and especially in the context of statements unprovable in higher theories) to view unprovable statements as possessing a large "amount of logical strength" that allows us to build approximations of models of strong theories.
Unprovability of PH
Nowadays unprovability of the Paris-Harrington Principle in Peano Arithmetic is presented via unprovability proof of KM followed by a proof that PH implies KM or by the combinatorial Ketonen-Solovay method using α-large sets or by a sequence of lemmas (gluing different colourings) as in the original article [69] . A model-theoretic proof was promised in the original article [69] but never appeared. This was a folklore understanding in the 1970s and 1980s that a model-theoretic proof can be written down. The closest it got is in the treatment of n-extendible initial segments by J. Paris on pages 324-328 in [71] and in the book by P. Hájek and P. Pudlák [43] but still far from being instantly accessible to a wide audience. We shall give a single simple proof (inspired by the Kanamori-McAloon proof [47] ) that will be useful in logic courses. There will be one colouring which will yield a desired set of indiscernibles among its large homogeneous set. To our knowledge, the proof below is the first time a simple direct model-theoretic unprovability proof for PH appears in print.
Finally, let me mention that all statements below, unprovable in Peano Arithmetic, are easy consequences of the Infinite Ramsey Theorem, so will usually be labeled as "true".
Theorem 1. (Paris-Harrington)
The statement "for all a, k, m, c, there is b > a such that for every f : [a, b] k → c, there is an f -homogeneous H ⊂ N of size m such that |H| > min H" is not provable in Peano Arithmetic.
The readers who need a reminder of basic notions from logic (e.g., models of arithmetic, overspill and the usual way in which sets, functions and formulas are encoded and treated within a model of arithmetic) are referred to Kaye's textbook [48] .
Proof. Let M IΣ 1 be nonstandard, a, e ∈ M be nonstandard and ϕ 1 (z, x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x e ) , . . . , ϕ e (z, x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x e ) be the first e ∆ 0 -formulas in at most the free variables shown. In particular, this list contains all ∆ 0 -formulas of standard size. Denote R(2e +
if such i exists and e + 1 otherwise. (In order to write down this formula we should use a formula that represents the satisfaction relation for ∆ 0 -formulas.) Informally, f (c,
is the first formula (with a parameter smaller than c allowed) that distinguishes the tuples
Define another function h, defined on [a, b] 2e+1 , as follows: 
Choose a g-homogeneous set H ⊆ [a, b] of size at least r(e) and such that |H| > min H. Let us show that the value of g on [H] 4e+1 is 0. Suppose that the value of g on [H] 4e+1 is j = 0.
Notice that then there are not more than
Hence, by the pigeonhole principle, there are
, which is a contradiction. Hence the value of g on [H] 4e+1 is 0. Since |H| ≥ r(e), there is a set C ⊆ H of 5e + 1 points c 0 < · · · < c 5e in H such that for any two (2e + 1)-tuples c < d 1 < d 2 and c < d
4e+1 . Hence
1 we shall often shorten c < a 1 < · · · < ae < b 1 < · · · < be as c < a < b which is impossible since we have only two truth values. Hence i = e + 1 and we can conclude that the set C = {c 0 < c 1 < · · · < c 2e } is our desired set of indiscernible elements (=indiscernibles): for any standard ∆ 0 -formula ϕ(z, x 1 , . . . , x n ) any c ∈ C , any d 1 < · · · < d n and e 1 < · · · < e n above c and any p < c, we have ϕ (p, d 1 , . . . , d n ) ↔ ϕ(p, e 1 , . . . , e n ). Now we shall repeat the usual argument that the initial segment I = sup k∈N c k is a model of Peano Arithmetic. Once we prove that, observe that I PA + ¬PH since b > I was the minimal point for which a large homogeneous set exists for every colouring g : [a, b] 4e+1 → 3e + 1.
To prove that I satisfies PA, we have to show that I is closed under addition and multiplication and satisfies the induction scheme. All other axioms are inherited from M .
Hence I is a structure in the language of arithmetic. Let us now show that the scheme of induction holds in I. Let p ∈ I and ϕ(p, x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n , x) be such that I ∃x ∀x 1 ∃x 2 ∀x 3 . . . ϕ(p, x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n , x), i.e., we take an arbitrary formula with a parameter p ∈ I and one free variable x and assume that there is x ∈ I which satisfies it. We want to find a minimal such x in I. For some k ∈ N and some ∈ I, we have p, < c k and
We have shown that I PA + ¬PH and our proof is complete.
In this proof, we actually needed much less from our nonstandard ground model than that it satisfies IΣ 1 , namely ∆ 0 -induction and existence of Ramsey numbers (i.e., closedness under the tower-function) but the assumption of existence of Ramsey numbers can be eliminated (by the overspill argument below), so ∆ 0 -induction plus totality of exponentiation is enough.
Also notice that the model of PA + ¬PH was constructed from just one nonstandard instance of PH (the existence of b ∈ M such that for any colouring [a, b] 4e+1 → 3e + 1 there exists a large homogeneous subset of size r(e)). Why would such an instance exist? We could of course start with a ground model M IΣ 1 + PH and not worry any more (this should be the pedagogically preferred option). However notice that for every standard a, n ∈ M there is b n such that for any colouring [a, b n ] 4n+1 → 3n + 1, there exists a homogeneous H of size r(n) such that |H| > min H (because PH holds in the "standard model" part of M ). Now do a ∆ 0 -overspill argument to find the nonstandard numbers a, e and b as needed in the beginning of the proof. (Notice also that this overspill argument immediately re-proves the famous fact that every nonstandard model of IΣ 1 has many initial segments satisfying PA. Probably this is a well-known observation.)
A good exercise for the reader at this stage would be to modify the proof of Theorem 1 to show that the number of colours in PH can be fixed as 2 and the statement stays unprovable. A stronger result (unprovability of the Paris-Harrington principle in fixed dimension and two colours) belongs to J. Paris and is Lemma 29 in [71] . Another exercise for the reader would be to modify the above proof and get unprovability with fixed a = 0.
Adapted version of PH
The unprovability proof for PH is now easy (as easy as for KM) but we can formulate unprovable statements with yet simpler unprovability proofs if we sacrifice one exponent. I suggest that logic courses can use the proofs below instead of proofs for PH or KM.
First, we present an adapted version of PH, whose unprovability is established easily by one straightforward step, and the proof is rid of all unnecessary combinatorics. Theorem 2. The statement "for all m, n and c, there exists N such that for every f : [N ] n → c, there is an f -homogeneous H ⊂ N , of size at least m and such that |H| > n · (2 n·min H + 1)" is not a theorem of Peano Arithmetic.
Proof.
We shall prove unprovability already with c = 2. Let M IΣ 1 be nonstandard, e ∈ M N, and ϕ 1 (x 1 , . . . , x e , y), . . . , ϕ e (x 1 , . . . , x e , y) be the enumeration of the first e ∆ 0 -formulas in at most the free variables shown. Suppose N ∈ M is the minimal point such that for every Hence, by homogeneity, f is constant 0 on [H] 2e+1 . Let d 1 < · · · < d e be the last e elements of H. Then for any a < b 1 < · · · < b e and a < c 1 < · · · < c e in H {d 1 , . . . , d e }, we have: for every x < a,
which is the indiscernibility condition we need. Again define an initial segment I as the supremum of the first N points of H and notice that I PA and that I satisfies the negation of our statement.
Adapted version of KM
For KM, there is also a short adapted version which we first presented in [10] .
Theorem 3. The statement "for all m, a and n with n < m, there is b > a such that for every f : [a, b] n → 2 nb such that f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) < 2 n·x1 , there is an f -min-homogeneous subset of [a, b] of size m" is not provable in Peano Arithmetic.
Proof.
Let M IΣ 1 be a nonstandard ground model, e, a, b ∈ M N, e < a < b and b ∈ M be minimal such that for every function f defined on [a, b] e+1 such that f (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x e ) < 2 e·x0 , there is a min-homogeneous subset of [a, b] of size 2e. Let ϕ 1 (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x e ), . . . , ϕ e (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x e ) be the first e ∆ 0 -formulas in not more than the e + 1 free variables shown. Define f as follows: for every 1 (p, x 1 , . . . , x e ) } . . .
i.e., f (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x e ) is a code of a collection of e subsets of [0,
and notice that for every ∆ 0 -formula ϕ(x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x n ), any i 0 < i 1 < · · · < i n and i 0 < j 1 < · · · < j n and all p < c i0 , we have M ϕ(p, c i1 , . . . , c in ) ↔ ϕ(p, c j1 , . . . , c jn ), which is exactly our indiscernibility condition. Again define an initial segment I as the supremum of the first N points of H and notice that I PA and that I satisfies the negation of our statement.
5 Model-theoretic proof of a threshold result for PH
The following theorem was first proved by A. Weiermann in [89] using ordinals.
Theorem 4. For every n ∈ ω, Peano Arithemtic does not prove PH log (n) .
The combinatorial treatment of KM was done by G. Lee in [59] , also using ordinals.
Theorem 5. For every n ∈ ω, Peano Arithmetic does not prove KM log (n) .
We shall give one model-theoretic proof of both of these theorems. It is also possible to show by a combinatorial argument how each of these statements implies PH, by a usual trade-off where increased dimension allows for weaker largeness restrictions on a homogeneous set. The reader can think of these possible combinatorial arguments as being already incorporated into the complete model-theoretic proof below.
For every number a, let X(a) be the set coded by a. We fix a coding method such that every subset of [0, a] has a code before 2 a+1 + 1. For example, let every X ⊆ [0, a] be coded by a i=0 χ(i) · 2 i , where χ is the characteristic function of X. Let us first write down the proof for n = 1.
As usual, take a nonstandard ground model M IΣ 1 and elements a > e > N. Let ϕ 1 (z, x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x e ), . . . , ϕ e (z, x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x e ) be the first e ∆ 0 -formulas in at most the free variables shown. In particular, this list will contain all ∆ 0 -formulas of standard size. Denote R(2e + 1, e + 2, 10e + 1) by r(e). Let b ∈ M be minimal such that for every
2e+1 → e + 2, the minimal formula of disagreement, as before:
) if such i exists and e + 1 otherwise. Define a regressive function h, the minimal parameter of disagreement, as before:
2 ) = e + 1 and c otherwise. Now, define a log-regressive function defined on
and log(c) otherwise. Here ∆ denotes the symmetric difference relation:
Now, define the main colouring g : [a, b] 8e+1 → 5e + 1 as follows: 
Choose H 1 ⊂ H of size 10e + 1, homogeneous for f . This can be done by our definition of r(e). Let H 2 be H 1 {the last 4e elements of H 1 }.
Let us show that f | [H2] 2e+1 = e + 1. Suppose that f | [H2] 2e+1 has constant value i = e + 1 and we shall get a contradiction. List H 2 as c < d 1 < · · · < d 6 . Denote the value of (c, . . .) on H 2 by p and let h(c,
Let us first notice that p 1 , p 2 and p 3 are all different. If two of them coincided, say
Since i = e + 1, we know that q < c. Suppose without loss of generality that
, we conclude that d 3 and d 5 disagree on q, which contradicts our knowledge that ϕ i (q, d 3 ) and ϕ i (q, d 5 ) are both false. We arrived at a contradiction, hence p 1 = p 2 , p 1 = p 3 and p 2 = p 3 and the sets X(p 1 ), X(p 2 ) and X(p 3 ) are different.
Notice that by definition of , we have p ∈ X(p 1 ) ⇔ p ∈ X(p 2 ), p ∈ X(p 2 ) ⇔ p ∈ X(p 3 ) and p ∈ X(p 1 ) ⇔ p ∈ X(p 3 ), which are contradictory assertions. Hence f | [H2] 2e+1 = e + 1 and H 2 is our desired set of indiscernibles.
On the way we also proved PA KM log : indeed the set H 1 is obtained as minhomogeneous for the log-regressive function . Now the proof for arbitrary n. The idea is the same as in case n = 1. We shall make n steps downstairs and focus the contradiction below log (n) (c).
As usual, take a nonstandard ground model M IΣ 1 and elements a > e > N. Let ϕ 1 (z, x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x e ), . . . , ϕ e (z, x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x e ) be the first e ∆ 0 -formulas in the free variables shown. In particular, this list will contain all ∆ 0 -formulas of standard size. Denote R(2e + 1, e + 2, 5 · 2 n · e + 1) by r(e). Let b ∈ M be minimal such that for every g : [a, b] n+2 e + 1)-subsets of H is 0. Since |H| ≥ r(e), we can choose an f -homogeneous H ⊆ H, of size 5 · 2 n · e + 1. Let us show that the value of f on (2e + 1)-subsets of H is e + 1, thus producing our desired set of indiscernibles. Let H = H {the last 2 n+1 · e points of H }. List the set H as c < d
Notice that the function (c, . . .) is constant on H . Denote the value of on H by p. Again, show (by an argument similar to the argument above) that p It is clear that on the way we proved that Peano Arithmetic does not prove KM log (n) : notice that an -min-homogeneous set of size r(e) produces the same set of indiscernibles as in our proof.
We conjecture that the proof above can now be converted into a proof of the full A. Weiermann's threshold result from [89] : Peano Arithmetic does not prove PH f , where f (n) = log H −1 ε 0 (n) (n), where H ε0 is the ε 0 th function in the Hardy hierarchy (that eventually dominates all PA-provably recursive functions).
Another approach to proving threshold results for PH would be to use Lemma 3.3. of [47] (which gives KM-thresholds) and then prove combinatorial implications between PH f and KM g for different functions f and g. In the case of PH-thresholds, this would require the same amount of work as we did above.
